

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SECTO 01067 01 OF 02 230008Z

61

ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

----- 111907

O 222306Z JAN 76 ZFF4

FM USDEL SECRETARY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SECTO 01067

NODIS

FOR ATHERTON FROM DAY

E.O. 11652: XGDS3

TAGS: PFOR, IS, US

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM TO PRESIDENT RE RABIN VISIT STRATEGY

1. SECRETARY HAS REVIEWED DRAFT AND HAS INDICATED SOME GENERAL POINTS HE WANTS WORKED IN AS WELL AS SOME SPECIFIC CHANGES. FOLLOWING ADDITIONS AND MODIFICATIONS ARE DRAFTED TO TAKE HIS THOUGHTS INTO ACCOUNT, AND ALTHOUGH HE HAS NOT REVIEWED REDRAFT HE WANTS YOU TO GO AHEAD WITH IT AT THAT END.

2. PAGE ONE -- ADD IN LINE TWO AFTER RIGIDITY,;
QTE IN PART BECAUSE OF THE SYRIAN DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE, UNQTE
PAGE ONE -- ADD AT END OF FIRST PARA, AFTER RELATIONS:
QTE TO A POINT WHERE WE CAN NO LONGER ASK FOR CONCESSIONS TO PROTECT OUR ARAB RELATIONS

PAGE ONE, FIRST TICK: ELIMINATE QTE ENTIRELY UNQTE

PAGE TWO, SUBSTITUTE FOLLOWING FOR LAST SENTENCE OF (A): QTE A STATEMATE WILL CONTINUE THE UPSURGE OF PRO-PALESTINIAN SENTIMENT, AS EVERY ARAB COUNTRY USES THE PLO AS AN ALIBI FOR A STALEMATE. UNQTE

PAGE TWO, SUBSTITUTE FOLLOWING FOR FIRST TICK UNDER
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SECTO 01067 01 OF 02 230008Z

(C): QTE -- A DRAMATIC ISRAELI TERRITORIAL OFFER

ON THE WEST BANK, THE GOLAN HEIGHTS AND PERHAPS THE
SINAI, OR UNQTE

PAGE THREE, ADD FOLLOWING TO END OF FIRST TICK:
QTE YOU SHOULD STRESS THAT THE PATTERN OF CONFRONTA-
TION AND LEAKAGE IS NO LONGER ACCEPTABLE TO US.

PAGE FOUR: AFTER FIRST SENTENCE OF BACKGROUND, ELIMINATE
REST OF PARA AND FIRST SENTENCE OF PARA TWO AND SUB-
STITUTE FOLLOWING:

QTE THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, APPARENTLY
SATISFIED AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING WITH THE
POST-SINAI II STATUS QUO, HAS PURSUED A POLICY THAT
MUST INEVITABLE LEAD TO A STALEMATE IF IT IS CONTINUED.
ISRAEL HAS HELD OUT LITTLE HOPE TO THE ARAB GOVERN-
MENTS THAT ATTEMPTS TO NEGOTIATE FURTHER ISRAELI
WITHDRAWALS WOULD PRODUCE FRUITFUL RESULTS. THE
ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAD ALREADY, IN THE SUMMER OF
1974, FAILED TO MAKE A TERRITORIAL OFFER TO JORDAN,
FOR WITHDRAWAL ON THE WEST BANK, SUFFICIENT TO ENABLE
HSSEIN TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS. THE SUBSEQUENT, AND
IN PART RESULTING, ARAB DECISION TO NAME THE PLO
AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIANS FOR ANY SUCH
NEGOTIATIONS HAS TENDED TO FREEZE THE POSSIBILITIES
FOR POLITICAL PROGRESS ON THIS FRONT. FOLLOWING
THE CONCLUSION OF SIANI II, THE HARD ISRAELI POSITION
CONCERNING WITHDRAWALS ON THE GOLAN HAS SIMILARLY
GIVEN THE SYRIANS NO ENCOURAGEMENT TO NEGOTIATE.
THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS ARE CLOSE TO THE PRESENT
LINE, AND ISRAELI STATEMENTS HAVE GIVEN LITTLE REASON
TO BELIEVE THAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO GIVE UP
ANY SETTLEMENT IN AN INTERIM AGREEMENT. ISRAEL,
MOREOVER, NEVER ADVANCED THE UNILATERAL PROPOSAL
RABIN HAD PROMISED IN JUNE.

WITH THE AVENUES FOR PROGRESS ON TERRITORIAL ISSUES
CLOSED PRIMARILY BY ISRAEL'S UNWILLINGNESS TO MOVE ON THE
WEST BANK OR GOLAN, THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE HAS EMERGED
AS THE NEW FOCAL POINT OF POLITICAL CONFRONTATION.
SYRIA, RETAINING ITS INTEREST IN A NEGOTIATED SETTLE-
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SECTO 01067 01 OF 02 230008Z

MENT BUT SEEKING A MORE ADVANTAGEOUS CONTEXT FOR
NEGOTIATIONS, HAS TURNED TO BUILDING POLITICAL SUPPORT.
ASAD ANNOUNCED ... ETC. UNQTE

PAGE FOUR -- INSERT FOLLOWING AFTER SUPPORT IN THIRD
FROM LAST LINE: QTE BOTH ON THE PLO ISSUE UNQTE

PAGE FIVE-- ELIMINATE FINAL SENTENCE OF FIRST

PARTIAL PARA.

PAGE SEVEN -- SUBSTITUTE FOLLOWING FOR FIRST THREE SENTENCES OF FINAL PARTIAL PARA:

QTE THE NET EFFECT OF ISRAELI POLICY, AND OF THE DEVELOPMENTS FOR WHICH IT HAS BEEN PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE, HAS THUS BEEN A DEEPENING STALEMATE WITH THE MOST SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. THE RIGID ISRAELI STANCE REGARDING TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS TO THE ARABS HAS FORCED THE POLITICAL FOCUS AROUND TO THE PLO, WHICH HAS BECOME THE CENTRAL POINT OF THE MIDDLE EAST DEBATE AND WHICH POSES SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. AT THE SAME TIME, ISRAEL HAS SOUGHT TO WEAKEN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES BY BRINGING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON US OVER ARAB BOYCOTT ISSUES, BY LEAKS TO THE PRESS CALCULATED TO EMBARRASS US WITH THE ARABS, ETC.--A POLICY THAT CAN ONLY HAVE THE EFFECT OF LIMITING OUR CAPACITY TO HELP BOTH SIDES IN THE SEARCH FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

ONE MUST RECOGNIZE, OF COURSE, THAT ISRAELI UNWILLINGNESS TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE IS FOUNDED AT LEAST IN PART ON THE UNDERLYING LACK OF SYMMETRY IN ANY TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT ISRAEL MAKES. THE ISRAELIS GIVE UP LAND -- A CONCRETE AND ESSENTIALLY IRREVERSIBLE STEP -- AND GET IN RETURN ARAB POLITICAL COMMITMENTS -- LESS CONCRETE AND MORE EASILY REVERSED, PARTICULARLY IN THE EYES OF THE ISRAELIS, WHO HAVE LITTLE CONFIDENCE IN COMMITMENTS THE ARABS MIGHT MAKE.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 SECTO 01067 01 OF 02 230008Z

WE RELAIZED THAT WE COULD NOT EXPECT TO MAKE DECISIVE PROGRESS IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS DURING 1976, BUT WE ALSO UNDERSTOOD THAT IT WAS VITALLY IMPORTANT THAT SOME PROGRESS BE MADE SO THAT WE CAN PRESS FORWARD AGAIN IN 1977. IF WE DO NOT MAKE SUCH PROGRESS, AND IF THE SENSE OF MOVEMENT AND DIRECTION WE HAVE GIVEN TO MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS SINCE 1973 IS LOST, AN IRREVERSIBLE PROCESS WILL SET IN LEADING TOWARD POLARIZATION, POLITICAL DETERIORATION IN WHICH SADAT AND OTHER ARAB MODERATES WILL BE UNDERMINED, AND ULTIMATELY RENEWED HOSTILITIES. SUCH A TREND ... ETC. UNQTE

PAGE NINE -- ELIMINATE ALL FROM QTE OVERSTATE THE DANGERS UNQTE TO QTE AND THEY UNQTE IN MID-PAGE.

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE 01 SECTO 01067 02 OF 02 222351Z

61

ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

----- 111711

O 222306Z JAN 76 ZFF-4

FM USDEL SECRETARY IN MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SECTO 01067

NODIS

PAGE NINE: ADD TO END OF PRESENT TEXT: QTE AND
THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE CANNOT BE REACTIVATED, AT
THIS POINT, UNLESS ISRAEL IS PREPARED TO MAKE PRECISE
AND SPECIFIC PROPOSALS REGARDING ITS READINESS TO
WITHDRAW IN RETURN FOR APPROPRIATE POLITICAL COMMIT-
MENTS. NOT ONLY WILL ARAB GOVERNMENTS OTHERWISE
BE UNWILLING TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS, BUT THE IDEA OF
HUSSEIN AS A NEGOTIATOR FOR THE WEST BANK IS A
NON-STARTER WITHOUT AN ISRAELI MOVE OF THIS CHARACTER.
WHAT IS NEEDED NOW, TO GIVE A WHOLE NEW AND POSITIVE
CAST TO THE SITUATION, IS A SWEEPING ISRAELI PROPOSAL
CONCERNING WITHDRAWALS ON THE GOLAN, THE WEST BANK
AND PERHAPS THE SINAI IN EXCHANGE FOR AN ARAB
COMMITMENT OF NON-BELLIGERENCY. UNQTE

PAGE TEN -- FOLLOWING FIRST PARA SECRETARY WOULD LIKE
EXPLANATION OF RABIN'S ATTITUDE BASED ON 1971-72
EXPERIENCES. APPRECIATE IF DEPARTMENT CAN PROVIDE.

PAGE TWELVE -- IN FIFTH LINE, REPLACE STEAMROLLER
WITH QTE GAINS UNQTE.

PAGE TWELVE -- IN FIRST SENTENCE SECOND PARA,
ELIMINATE ALL AFTER LEADERSHIPBS

PAGE FIFTEEN -- IN MID-PAGE, ELIMINATE QTE ON THE
PALESTINIAN ISSUE UNQTE AFTER QTE DEMANDED BY THE
U.S. UNQTE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SECTO 01067 02 OF 02 222351Z

PAGE EIGHTEEN -- ADD TO PRESENT TEXT, AT END OF PAGE:
QTE IT DID NOT SHOW, HOWEVER, THAT HE HAS MODIFIED
HIS OPPOSITION TO ANY DEALINGS WITH THE PLO, SINCE
THE KIND OF PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION HE WAS
SUGGESTING WAS OF AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT ORDER. UNQTE

PAGE NINETEEN -- IN MID-PAGE, SUBSTITUTE QTE THE
UNWORKABILITY OF UNQTE FOR QTE OUR THOROUGH
DISSATISFACTION WITH UNQTE.

PAGE TWENTY-TWO -- SUBSTITUTE FOLLOWING FOR PARTIAL
PARA BEGINNING AT BOTTOM OF PAGE: QTE THE TERRITORIAL
OPTION COULD INVOLVE THE GOLAN -- WITH SYRIA -- THE
WEST BANK -- WITH JORDAN -- OR, IN COMBINATION WITH
EITHER OR BOTH, THE SINAI -- WITH EGYPT. THE
TERRITORIAL ASPECTS OF THIS OPTION AMOUNT TO AN ANSWER
TO THE QUESTION: WHAT IS ISRAEL WILLING TO GIVE
FOR NON-BELLIGERENCY?

PAGE TWENTY-FOUR -- INSERT FOLLOWING PARA AFTER FIRST
PARTIAL PARA: QTE A FURTHER SINAI WITHDRAWAL WOULD
PROBABLY NOT BE A VIABLE OPTION UNACCOMPANIED BY
MOVEMENT ON ONE OF THE OTHER FRONTS, GIVEN THE VIOLENT
OPPOSITION SADAT WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY ENCOUNTER
FROM THE ENTIRE ARAB WORLD (WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR
HIS SAUDI AID) IF HE MOVED ALONE. UNQTE

PAGE TWENTY-SEVEN -- REPLACE SECOND TALKING POINT
WITH FOLLOWING: QTE -- IT SEEMS CLEAR TO ME
ISRAEL'S RIGIDITY, NOW THAT SINAI II IS IN BEING,
IS THE MAJOR FACTOR IN THIS. I WANT TO SAY THIS
FRANKLY AT THE OUTSET OF OUR TALKS. ISRAELI POLICY
IS LEADING BOTH OUR COUNTRIES INTO A SITUATION THAT
WILL HAVE THE MOST SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR BOTH
OF US. I WANT ALSO TO SAY, AT THE OUTSET, HOW MUCH
I DEPLORE THE WAY IN WHICH YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS
CONDUCTED ITS RELATIONS WITH US IN THE MONTHS SINCE
THE SINAI AGREEMENT WAS CONCLUDED. UNQTE

PAGE TWENTY-SEVEN -- IN THIRD LINE FROM END

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SECTO 01067 02 OF 02 222351Z

SUBSTITUTE QTE OTHERS UNQTE FOR QTE THE ARABS UNQTE.

PAGE TWENTY-EIGHT -- IN SEVENTH AND EIGHTH LINES,
SUBSTITUTE QTE SEVERAL YEARS UNQTE FOR QTE A YEAR
OR TWO AT LEAST UNQTE.

PAGE TWENTY-EIGHT -- IN SECOND SENTENCE, THIRD
COMPLETE TICK, ELIMINATE ALL FROM QTE BY WHICH TIME
UNQTE THROUGH QTE FULL SCALE NEGOTIATIONS UNQTE,
AND ELIMINATE FINAL WORD QTE AWAY UNQTE.

PAGE TWENTY-NINE -- ELIMINATE SUBPARA NUMBER ONE
UNDER FINAL TICK ON PAGE, RENUMBERING REST.

PAGES 35-36 -- ELIMINATE SECTION ON ARMS FOR EGYPT.
KISSINGER

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